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ABSTRACT With the point of departure in the otherwise extensive knowledge on
reform and routine within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European
Union (EU), this paper argues that: (1) in order to fully appreciate the insights provided
we need to look into the complementary nature of ideational and interest-based
approaches; and (2) lessons can be learned by comparing several (here, three of five)
reform attempts and by pointing out the importance of periods in between reforms
(here, covering a time horizon stretching from 1980 to 2003). Against this background,
the paper offers a comprehensive logic of policy development that may be used for other
areas of study, which both draws on the insights into bargaining processes as offered by
rational choice institutional theory and the insight into arguing processes as offered by
constructivist approaches.
KEY WORDS: Policy development, Common Agricultural Policy, constructivism, 
rational choice institutionalism
Introduction
The point of departure for this paper is the view that in order to fully appre-
ciate the insights provided by the literature on policy reform and routine
within the CAP, we need to look into the complementary nature of ideational
and interest-based approaches. We argue that two significant lessons may be
learned for other areas of study: (1) more comprehensive understandings of
policy development should consider both medium to long term ideational
development and short term rational actor bargaining and (2) the periods in
Correspondence Address: Kennet Lynggaard, Department of Society and Globalization,
Roskilde University, Universitetsvej 1, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark. E-mail: kennetl@ruc.dk
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between policy reforms are as important as the periods leading up to the
actual reform act.
Since the 1980s, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European
Union (EU) has been subject to a series of reform attempts, namely in 1984,
1988, 1992, 1999 and 2003. Numerous studies have sought to explain the
causes and consequences of these reforms. The studies can broadly be cate-
gorized depending on whether their emphasis is on rationalist bargaining or
constructivist arguing processes. Studies also differ in the number of reforms
they examine — single or more (see Table 1).
Theoretical frameworks which focus on bargaining processes — explicitly
or implicitly — take their point of departure in rationalist assumptions,
including the existence of exogenously given and stable preferences, and the
belief that agents enter into negotiations in order to maximize their interests.
These studies tend to focus on the regulatory aspect of the CAP in the sense
that negotiations evolve around specific institutional choices and their
distributional effects. Theoretical frameworks which focus on arguing —
explicitly or implicitly — take their point of departure in constructivist
assumptions, including the constitutive nature of ideas. These studies also
tend to focus on the ‘space of possibility’ that agents operate within, and how
this ‘space’ may change over time.
Single reform studies emphasize the causes and consequences of one
particular CAP reform. These studies tend to have an analytical eye on the
immediate context before and after points in time that have been formally
appointed — most often by the Commission — as reforms of the CAP.
Comparative reform studies are studies covering two or more CAP reforms.
A comparison may be conducted with the aim of generating more general
theoretical knowledge concerning reform and routine, but, most often, two
or more reforms may be covered by means of historical, descriptive analysis,
which suggests more eclectic explanations of dissimilar CAP reforms and/or
how reforms may feed into later reform attempts.
Table 1. Types of explanations and methods in the study of CAP reforms
Types of method
Single reform studies Comparative reform studies
Types of explanations
Rationalist bargaining e.g. Paarlberg (1997), 
Daugbjerg (1998, 1999), 
Landau (1998), Pollack 
(1998), Nedergaard 
(2006b)
e.g. Nedergaard, Hansen, and 
Mikkelsen (1993), Patterson (1997), 
Ackrill (2000), Kay (2003), Moyer 
and Josling (2002), Daugbjerg 
(2003), Nedergaard (2006a)
Constructivist arguing e.g. Lenschow and Zito 
(1998), Skogstad (1998), 
Coleman and Tangermann 
(1999), Fouilleux (2004)
e.g. Coleman (1998), Sheingate 
(2000), Garzon (2006), Lynggaard 
(2006)
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The Logic of Policy Development: CAP 1980–2003 293
To be sure, several studies of CAP reforms cut across the bargaining and
arguing divide. However, even when more interest and ideational explana-
tions of reform and routine are considered, the interrelationship between
constructivist ideational and rationalist interest-based explanations remains
unclear. In fact, the distinctiveness of ideational explanations tends to be
blurred in such studies where ideas are made the property of individuals or
collective agents and are not easily differentiated from interest. The core
theoretical claim of the paper is that it can deliver a more elaborate under-
standing of the relationship between constructivist ideational explanations
on the one hand and rational choice institutional interest-based explanations
on the other hand.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section will discuss the types
of explanations offered by studies of CAP reform, emphasizing rational actor
bargaining and constructivist arguing processes, respectively. The second
section will suggest how the two types of explanations may be conceived as
complementary rather than competing. In this section we will investigate the
relationship between the ‘interest’-based approach, emphasizing institutional
factors, and the ‘ideational’-based approach, emphasizing changes of prefer-
ences. The third section will supply an empirical analysis covering the period
from 1980 to 2003. Finally, by way of comparison, conclusions are drawn
on the basis of this case about the lessons which can be learned for the study
of reform and routine more generally.
Literature Review
Rational actor perspectives on bargaining processes within the CAP are by
far the most common concerning policy developments. More recently,
constructivist arguing perspectives on the formation and changes in prefer-
ences have seen the light of the day. By means of a brief review of the
literature on rational actor bargaining and constructivist arguing within the
CAP, the ground will be prepared for developing a more comprehensive
framework for the study of policy development drawing on both perspectives
(section on ‘The Dialectic of Ideas and Interests in Explaining Policy
Developments’). Whereas the review adopts a broad conception of institu-
tions in order to make full use of the wide-ranging literature on CAP devel-
opments, the subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses advance a more
narrow definition of institutions in order to reconcile and, thus, make the
most of, the respective strengths of rational choice institutionalist and
constructivist perspectives.
Rational Actor Bargaining
Many studies of policy developments within the CAP are based on the
assumption that the agents involved are fully, or mostly, rational utility
maximizers. Policy developments — whether in terms of reform or routine
— are thus the product of bargaining processes among such agents under the
prevailing institutional conditions at any given point in time. Furthermore,
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from this perspective, policy developments are commonly assessed in terms
of the total expenditures of the CAP and, possibly, in terms of the distribu-
tional effects among member states, regions, farmers, consumers and tax
payers. In other words, in order to accept an observation within the CAP as
a policy reform, it needs to have actual effects on the CAP budget and/or the
distribution of financial resources among the involved agents (Nedergaard
2006a). In fact, policy reforms tend to be understood as budgetary retrench-
ment, which has rarely been observed within the fifty-year history of the
CAP. The explanations of policy development on offer from this perspective
are manifold, but all tend to evolve around the interests and institutional
conditions of the central agents within the CAP.
The Council of Farm Ministers is commonly seen as being strongly in
favour of policy continuity. Several reasons have been given for this. First,
the existence of a permanent free-rider problem means that member states
seek to get as much back as possible from the CAP budget, where expenses
are carried collectively (Ackrill 2000). Secondly, the agricultural sector
and food production are considered a matter of national interest by most
member states. For this reason, member states have, for the greater part of
CAP’s development, been reluctant to ‘outvote’ each other as one’s own
national interests may be at stake some time in the near future. This is the
case even if the Council of Farm Ministers is more likely to conduct explicit
votes than other Councils. It has been argued recently, however, that when
the Council of Farm Ministers is able to come to an agreement on policy
reform, the reform output tends to be more substantial than when agricul-
tural reform is made a matter for the European Council (Daugbjerg and
Swinbank 2007).
The Commission — including the Commission Services — is usually seen
as the agent of policy reform within the CAP, not least due to the financial
and administrative resources being tied up by this policy field, which could
otherwise be used for pursuing other policy ambitions. However, the latitude
of the Commission to bring about change is limited. Several reasons for this
have been suggested. First, the Commission is closely monitored by member
state representatives, not just during day-to-day policy making, but also
during international negotiations on the liberalization of markets for agricul-
tural products (Pollack 1998). Secondly, the Commission has traditionally
been subject to intensive pressure from the farm lobby, which has enjoyed
privileged access to policy making, limiting the policy choices available to the
Commission (Grant 1993; Daugbjerg 1999). This is particularly pronounced
with regard to the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG Agriculture),
which has worked closely with the farm lobby in policy formulation. It has
even been suggested that a critical condition for change within the CAP has
been the easing off of pressures from, or even the absence of, the farm lobby
at times when a reform has been in the pipeline (Kay 1998; Ackrill 2000;
Nedergaard 2006b).
The farm lobby has thus been a very keen defender of the status quo. Not
only has the farm lobby been defending this position through their institu-
tionalized access to the Commission, but also on the national level the farm
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lobby has been engaged in neo-corporatist types of networks in most EU
member states — including Germany, France and the UK (Kay 1998; Pappi
and Henning 1999). The success of the farm lobby has been furthered by the
usual Olsonian logic of a lack of opposition from the less well-organized
consumers and taxpayers, which are characterized by having less well-
defined common preferences and less selective economic incentives to wield
policy claims (Olson [1965] 1971; Nedergaard 2006a).
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is, together with the Commission,
often seen as an agent generating pressure for CAP reform. Through
the quest for the liberalization of markets for agricultural products, the
WTO has put pressure on the level of EU agricultural subsidies and tariffs.
The pressure for reform may well be related to the extent to which the
Commissioner for Agriculture and the DG Agriculture succeed in remaining
in charge of international negotiations on agricultural matters or, otherwise,
if Commissioners and DGs representing broader trade and industrial interest
are involved (Grant 1997; Patterson 1997). The agreements reached within
the WTO are furthermore linked to formal rules which, if breached, allow
the WTO to accept retaliatory trade measures from countries affected by, for
example, undue trade barriers (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007).
Representing broader policy concerns other than agricultural ones, the
European Council may also give momentum to CAP reform to the extent
that agricultural issues are dealt with within this forum. It has thus been
suggested that when the level of conflict is too high for a decision to be made
within the Council of Ministers, agricultural issues may be referred to the
European Council for their resolution and, thus, be linked with broader
concerns, such as the EU’s budget and enlargements (Ackrill 2000; Moyer
and Josling 2002). However, recently it has been argued that when agricul-
tural issues form part of broader reform packages and are referred to the
European Council, the reform output also tends to be moderate due to the
attention given to other pressing issues on the European Council agenda
(Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2007).
Altogether, policy development from this perspective is the outcome of
bargaining processes in which individual or collective agents seek to maxi-
mize their interests which, in turn, are based on an analysis of the costs and
benefits of alternative policy choices. In other words, at the heart of these
studies are two logics of policy reform and routine; namely (1) the logic of
bargaining and (2) the logic of agents’ cost/benefit analysis. The logic of
bargaining within the CAP has been plentifully addressed and theorized, e.g.
in terms of principal–agent perspectives, rational choice theory and more
rationalistic historical institutional perspectives. However, the logic of cost/
benefit analysis is most often implicit and assumed and rarely subject to
explicit theoretical reflections. This gives rise to questions such as: What are
the types of costs and benefits that agents may reflect upon in the endeavour
to realize their preferences? And, is it possible that what is conceived of as
costs/benefits may not be exogenously given and stable, but, to some extent
and in some instances, reflect changes in the ideational context of the
bargaining processes?
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Constructivist Arguing
Few, yet an increasing number, of studies have given attention to ideas and
changing preferences in policy developments within the CAP. The exact
nature and role of ideas varies across these studies. Perhaps the point on
which there is the most agreement is that interest-based explanations are
inadequate for explaining developments within in the CAP, particularly
regarding policy change. Policy developments tend to be assessed in terms of
normative and discursive developments and these studies are often more, or
at least as, concerned with developments in between policy reforms as with
the actual act of adopting a policy reform. Finally, this body of literature has
also been more concerned with capturing the complexity of ideational and
normative developments within the CAP rather than supplying more parsi-
monious causal explanations.
There are significant variations across the literature as to the scope,
institutionalization and policy consequences of ideational developments
within the CAP. On the one hand are those studies that point up the
ideational continuity within the CAP. Along these lines, it has been suggested
that ideas in favour of a liberalization and internationalization of the agricul-
tural sector have not gained much ground within the CAP. The reasons for
this are first that the objectives of the CAP have been constitutionalized in the
sense that these are laid down in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Policy reform is
thus very difficult, possible only when there is unanimity among all member
states, and often requires ratification by national parliaments and/or national
referenda. Secondly, ideas of ‘agricultural exceptionalism’ and the ‘state
assistance’ policy paradigm enjoy a high degree of institutionalization among
all the central agents within the CAP, including the Council of Farm
Ministers, the DG Agriculture, the farm lobby, as well as within the wider
public. Essentially, this part of the literature explains policy routine by the
existence of highly institutionalized policy-preserving ideas (Skogstad 1998;
Lenshow and Zito 1998).
On the other hand, more recent studies have argued that ideas informing
the CAP have not remained the same and that expectations of what the CAP
should deliver have changed in the course of its development. Along these lines,
it has been suggested that ideas informing the CAP have moved from drawing
on a ‘dependent’ agriculture paradigm towards being more informed by ideas
found within the ‘multifunctional’ and ‘competitive’ agriculture paradigms
(Coleman, Grant, and Josling 2004; Garzon 2006). This involves moving from
a policy that emphasizes the need for securing otherwise uncertain markets
and protecting the agricultural sector from international competition, towards
a policy increasingly concerned with the agricultural sector as a provider of
public goods including rural development, environmental benefits, food safety
and quality. It also includes moving toward a policy increasingly concerned
with the international competitiveness of European agriculture. Various
ideational explanations have been offered for these changes.
First, it has been suggested that transnational epistemic communities,
including agro-economists, have contributed to ideational change by
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supplying new ideas for resolving problems faced and often generated by
traditional agricultural policies (Coleman, Grant, and Josling 2004).
Secondly, it has been suggested that the Commission and Commission
Services have increasingly acted as policy entrepreneurs by the strategic use
of discourse and through the build-up of in-house expertise and political
skills in the agricultural field throughout the 1990s (Fouilleux 2004). Along
these lines, the Commission, which has been delegated negotiating powers
in striking international trade agreements, has worked to link up negotia-
tions within the WTO with calls for reform of the CAP (Coleman and
Tangermann 1999). Thirdly, the cumulative effect of policy reforms, feed-
back processes and opening up policy networks to include agents other
than those traditionally governing the CAP, have all worked in favour of
changes of preferences from the early 1990s onwards (Sheingate 2000;
Daugbjerg 2003; Kay 2003; Garzon 2006). Studies with an emphasis on
ideational explanations of change have also pointed to the role of the
European Parliament as an agent of change by means of the articulation of
alternative conceptions of agricultural problems and solutions, and as an
agenda-setter of new concerns within the CAP (Garzon 2006; Lynggaard
2007a).
Altogether, according to this perspective, policy developments are
occurring against the background of an ideational context, which delimits
available, efficient and legitimate policy choices from those that are not. At
the heart of these studies are two basic logics (1) the logic of discursive
constructions and (2) policy entrepreneurship — whether enabled by
enhanced knowledge and persuasiveness (Coleman, Grant, and Josling
2004), the strategic use of discourse (Fouilleux 2004), or the discursive and
institutional context (Lynggaard 2007a). While supplying rich descriptive
analyses of ideational developments within the CAP, this perspective is also
characterized by a high level of explanatory diversity and complexity.
Further, this body of literature draws on different conceptions of the nature
and role of ideas in policy development. Some tend to conceptualize ideas as
the extension of national interests, others focus on the persuasive powers of
particularly ‘good’ ideas, while again others suggest explanations emphasiz-
ing processes of interaction between alternative ideas and collective policy
entrepreneurship as dynamics of ideational change. Finally, to the extent
interests are considered by these studies, the distinction between ideas and
interests remains unclear.
Against this background, this paper wishes to argue that, rather than
being in conflict, rational actor bargaining and constructivist arguing expla-
nations are complementary and may form the background for a more
comprehensive understanding of policy developments. On the one hand, an
ideational perspective may supply an understanding of change in interests in
the medium to longer term. On the other hand, whereas the ideational
perspective runs short of explaining short term decision making, an interest-
based approach emphasizing institutional factors may supply an under-
standing of specific negotiations among agents seeking to maximize their
interests.
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The Dialectic of Ideas and Interests in Explaining Policy Developments
Dialogue among dissimilar theories may be promoted along four different
pathways, namely by; testing competitive theoretical claims, identifying
domains of application, subsuming a less general theory under another more
fundamental theory, or by sequencing dissimilar theories (Jupille, Caporaso,
and Checkel 2003). Within EU studies, different routes have been followed
in the endeavour to promote theoretical dialogue, including tests of compet-
itive theoretical claims (e.g. Moravcsik 2001), the identification and specifi-
cation of theoretical domains (e.g. Checkel 2001a, 2001b) or theoretical
integration, which tend to subsume the strengths of one theoretical school of
thought (historical institutionalism) under a more general theoretical frame-
work (rational choice institutionalism) (see Rittberger and Stacey 2003;
Stacey and Rittberger 2003). Yet, it has also been suggested that it may be
particularly helpful to move towards a sequencing of constructivist and
rational choice institutional theory in order to capture a fuller picture of EU
decision making (Lewis 2003). With the ambition of establishing a more
comprehensive understanding of policy development, we will follow a
sequencing strategy linking constructivist theory on ideas and preference
formation, on the one hand, and rational choice institutional theory on ratio-
nal actor bargaining among EU institutions, on the other hand. In order to
avoid epistemological and ontological inconsistencies, it should be stressed
that we accept the cost–benefit institutionalist framed logic of rational choice
institutionalism; however, we acknowledge that this logic is based on socially
constructed ideas that can change in the medium and long term perspectives
and, thereby, influence the cost–benefit calculations.
Ideas are often conceptualized in opposition to interests (Griggs and
Howarth 2002). Whereas interests are bound up with agents and most often
seen as a reflection of their objective material conditions, ideas make up the
common conceptions or discursive context that agents draw upon and act
within. This also means that whereas interests are the property of individual
or collective agents, ideas are produced and reproduced — and possibly
subject to change — in the space in between a set of agents (Lynggaard
2007b). However, in this paper, rather than referring interests back to the
objective material conditions of agents, ideational changes are considered,
potentially, to give rise to change in preferences which, in turn, may alter
agents’ conception of their interests (see Hay 2006 for a further discussion).
In that sense, agents’ conception of their interest is constructed over the
course of time, even if such constructions are typically particularly resistant
to change. The time perspective is of great significance here. In the short
term, agents may seek to realize their conceived interests against the back-
ground of an analysis of their respective costs and benefits of alternative
policy choices. Yet, in the medium to longer term, ideational change may give
rise to changes in agents’ conception of the costs and benefits of alternative
policy choices and, in turn, alter agents’ conceived interests. This also means
that, rather than ascribing change in preferences to changes in the ‘mental
constructs’ of individuals (see, for example, North 1990), preference change
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is seen as a collective phenomenon reflecting changes in the discursive
context.
In this paper we assume (changing) ideas to be captured by (changing)
preferences, and interests to be represented by institutions and institutional
actors. Hence, preferences and institutions are taken to be concepts at the
most aggregate level. This level is chosen as the point of return of the concep-
tual reference due to the fact that we want to investigate the very logic of
policy development and not causal relationships at the more disaggregated
level.
The EU is characterized by its strong institutional actors which, among
other things, have the task of accelerating European economic-political
integration. Alongside the formal institutional actors of the EU there are
also institutional structures consisting of more or less organized interests
which might function in the shadow of more formal decision making.
Nevertheless, these institutions are often as important as the formal institu-
tional actors. Not least, European agriculture has from the very outset of the
European integration process been eager to organize at the European level
because it realized the importance of the Common Agricultural Policy.
Thus, by institutions we understand ‘channels in which the political process
can run’ and make a distinction by referring to institutional actors, including
the Commission, the Commission Services, the Council of Ministers and the
European Council. However, changes in EU policies and the implementation
of new EU political initiatives might not necessarily rely on changes in EU
institutions. In general, EU institutions are rather stable, yet preferences are
subject to change in the course of time and as a consequence of changes in
the discursive context of EU institutions. Thus, changing preferences of deci-
sion makers and the public at large are important factors when the policy
development of the EU is to be explained (Campbell 2004; Lynggaard
2007c).
For the purpose of this paper, ideas are not part of our definition of
institutions. Rather we separate ideas from institutions and see ideas as part
of the discursive context which shapes and, possibly, changes preferences.
Ideas are thus seen as the smallest units of a discourse, which enable, for
instance, the articulation of certain policy problems and solutions, while also
acting to delimit other policy problems and solutions from being articulated.
If and when the articulation of ideas is turned to a rule-based system of
concepts and conceptions, a discourse can be said to have unfolded (Kjær
and Pedersen 2001; Lynggaard 2006). We can condense the argument above
into the following political equation (Hix 2005, 13; Hinich and Munger
1997, 17): 
Many efforts have been made to show how parts of the EU’s agricultural
policy — both theoretically and with regard to concrete reform initiatives —
can be explained on the basis of rational choice institutional theory. Rational
preferences institutions outcome+ =
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choice institutional theory has shown itself suitable to explain circumstances
in the political process which have taken place within the space of a few years
while it has more difficulties explaining political processes stretching over
more than a few years. In policy analyses of the short term, rational choice
institutional theory often offers both a clear and simple explanation. At
the same time, it offers a theory that is consistent with dominant economic
theories which make it suitable in economical-political analyses.
In an international perspective, to a certain extent, theoretical develop-
ment in political science is equivalent to how and what parts of rational
choice institutionalism should be modified. Some of the critical points made
vis-à-vis rational choice institutional theory are directed at the following:
(1) rational choice institutional theory does not take into consideration ideas
and ideologies; (2) human beings are perceived as entities with predomi-
nantly a-historical, selfish characteristics; (3) the individual and only the
individual is the foundation of the theory; and (4) human beings act so
overwhelmingly rational as the theory proclaims (Blyth 2003).
We accept some of the criticism as justified. When it comes to political
preferences we agree that they are socially constructed in a specific historical
context. At the same time, we support the constructivist idea that preferences
are constructed in a language that is the result of a collective process where
ideals can play a decisive role (cf. Wittgenstein 2003). On the other hand, we
claim that rational choice institutional theory is suitable in order to explain
short term political outcomes when preferences are assumed to be relatively
stable. Hence, rational choice institutional theory becomes a theory for short
term political developments where the scope conditions — in the form of
unchanged political preferences — are almost constant.1
Over time, however, preferences tend to change. Hence, institutional
actors’ room for manoeuvre also moves. In other words, the idea behind this
move towards a logic of policy development drawing both on insight
provided by constructivist and rational choice institutional theory is that
even though preferences are socially constructed, they also appear ‘frozen’ or
fixed in the short term, which makes it possible for agents to calculate and
optimize on the basis of them. The ‘frozen’ or fixed preferences may last for
at least a few years. Then a thaw may take place and hereafter there is a basis
for the formation of a new set of ‘frozen’ preferences. In short, our funda-
mental political science equation is as follows when combining the two most
relevant theoretical frameworks in the analyses of EU’s policy outcomes: 
Finally, it should be clear that the objective of this paper is not to pinpoint
the causal mechanisms of policy developments. Rather, the objective is to
point to how a constructivist ideational perspective and a rationalist institu-
tional perspective may complement each other to form the basis for a more
comprehensive understanding of policy developments — whether in terms of
policy change or continuity.
preferences (constructivism) institutions (rational choice) outcome+ =
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The Development of the CAP 1980–2003
In the following, the logic of policy development as outlined will be applied
to the development of the Common Agricultural Policy. We will analyse
three attempts to reform the CAP since 1980, including the milk quota
reform of 1984, the MacSharry reform of 1992 and the so-called Fischler
reform of 2003. Along the lines of the constructivist argument, ideational
developments in the time leading up to the three reforms will also be consid-
ered, which leads us to point to three periods in the development of the CAP:
1980–1984, 1985–1992 and 1993–2003.
1980–1984
The central ideas informing the CAP in the early 1980s represented, in the
main, a continuation of ideas that had been articulated within the CAP at least
since the mid-1970s — some since the late 1960s. Ideas emphasizing the need
to deal with agricultural surplus production and budget pressures were
accepted as legitimate. At the same time, the CAP was conceived of as the main
protector of small producers and particularly disadvantaged agricultural
areas (Grant 1997; Jones and Clark 2001; Lynggaard 2006).
It was in this discursive context, starting in the 1970s, that milk produc-
tion became an increasingly pressing problem for CAP decision makers
culminating in the early 1980s. Year after year, production was larger than
consumption, and the production increased much more than consumption.
‘Butter Mountains’ and large stocks of milk powder became the order of the
day in the EU. The Commission put forward various proposals in order to
introduce duties on dairies or producers in cases of increasing deliveries of
milk. However, the proposals were all rejected because they were impossible
to implement — either from an administrative point of view or from a polit-
ical point of view. In consequence, in the beginning of 1983, the Commission
concluded that only two solutions were open in order to solve the problem
of the over supply of milk in the EU: either lower prices on milk or implement
quotas (Nedergaard 1995).
Lowering the prices on milk was problematic for decision makers because
it would demand a rather large price cut if it were to have any impact on milk
production. Basically, the reason for this is that agriculture is characterized
by having higher fixed costs compared to other businesses. These costs the
farmer has to pay no matter what. Hence, he will continue his business
longer in spite of lower prices than in most other sectors of the economy.
Most reports estimated that a price cut of 10 to 20 per cent was necessary on
the milk that farmers delivered to dairies if a significant reduction in produc-
tion was to happen (Nedergaard 1988). A price cut of that size would
certainly hurt incomes and the standard of living of many small farmers. In
consequence, according to the Commission, a number of special arrange-
ments were to be introduced in favour of small farmers if the price cut should
not lead to flourishing national subsidies. This left only one realistic option
open: the quota arrangement. The Commission, therefore, supported this
option (Nedergaard 1988).
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The first Commission proposal for a milk quota arrangement was negoti-
ated in the Council of Ministers in the autumn of 1983 without results.
Member states deeply disagreed about the introduction of the milk quota
arrangement. The UK wanted a lower total milk quota. Belgium wanted
special considerations vis-à-vis small farmers. The Netherlands wanted
another year of reference as the basis of the quota arrangement. The Irish
Republic wanted exemptions and threatened to veto any proposal. France
wanted to limit the imports of fodder as it saw these imports as the main
reason for the oversupply of milk. Luxembourg wanted specific consider-
ations vis-à-vis disadvantaged areas. This was also the case of Italy and it
wanted, along with Greece, another year of reference that would put it in a
better position (Nedergaard 1988).
After these preliminary negotiations, the Commission changed strategy
and put forward a proposal implying a 12 per cent price cut in case no quota
arrangement was adopted. A price cut of 12 per cent would lead to signifi-
cantly lower incomes for most milk producers, and it would especially hurt
small milk producers. Hence, the Commission put direct pressure on member
states in order to make them accept the quota arrangement. The Commission
succeeded with its strategy. After several meetings, the ministers of agricul-
ture agreed in March of 1984 on the introduction of a milk quota arrange-
ment. This arrangement implied a larger degree of flexibility than originally
envisaged by the Commission. Hence, member states could choose between
quotas relating to individual farms as well as on the level of diaries. The final
proposal also meant an increase in the total milk quotas as well as an extra
milk quota for Ireland (Nedergaard 1988).
As far as the milk quota arrangement is concerned, as can be seen, the
basic preferences relied on the commonly accepted conception of the CAP as
the protector of small farmers and farmers in disadvantaged rural areas,
which was a conception strategically used by the Commission to carry
through reform. On the top of these considerations only various technicali-
ties were discussed: the year of reference, the administrative level of quotas,
special treatment of certain member states, etc. The final reform was in line
with the expectations of Olsonian rational choice theory (Olson [1965]
1971): when a policy comes under pressure to be reformed, the final reform
will safeguard the well-organized interests at the costs of the less well-
organized interests due to the asymmetry of the ‘political market’. In the milk
quota arrangement this meant that consumers did not get the cuts in milk
prices that the over supply on the milk market made possible.
1985–1992
The problems of the CAP did, however, not wither away in the aftermath
of  the implementation of the milk quota arrangement in 1984. On the
contrary, the CAP came under increasing pressure during the so-called
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the beginning of the 1990s when the
USA successfully got trade in agricultural products onto the agenda. Within
the EU, the member states that were from the beginning against the reform
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were the UK, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and partly France. These
member states have either benefited from the traditional CAP (Denmark
and the Netherlands), benefited very little from the CAP in general (the UK)
and/or were producers of northern products (Belgium and partly France).
At  the same time, several member states that were originally against the
1992 reform were also strongly in favour of a General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). This was the case of the UK, the Netherlands and
Denmark. Therefore, these member states came increasingly under stress as
it became clear that a condition for a GATT solution was reform of the CAP
(Nedergaard 1995, 137).
As discussed previously, ideas informing the CAP are mainly characterized
by continuity. However, the period 1985–1992 may also be characterized by
significant ideational changes, which fed into the 1992 CAP reform. Thus, in
addition to a CAP informed by concerns with surplus production, budget
pressure, the protection of small farmers and particularly disadvantaged
agricultural areas, it had from 1985 onwards become acceptable and legiti-
mate also to conceive of the CAP as having a role to play as a protector of
the environment (Jones and Clark 2001; Lynggaard 2006).
Ideas on the CAP as the protector of the environment were first promoted
by groupings within the European Parliament, but soon such ideas were also
advocated by the Commission Services, the Commission, and later also
within the Farm Council (Jones and Clark 2001; Garzon 2006; Lynggaard
2006, 2007a). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) had pushed for decoupled payments (by the way, in line with
the farm policy already practised in the USA) for some time as this was
broadly recognized by economists as the least distorting and least welfare-
decreasing way of supporting farmers (Coleman, Grant, and Josling 2004).
The low price model — combining low prices with direct income support
measures — was perceived as much more welfare optimal than the EU’s high
price model where farmers were supported through high prices. This fact
would have great importance on both the 1992 MacSharry reform and later
also the 2003 Fischler reform.
It was in this discursive context that the Commission — one year before
the 1992 CAP reform — had put forward guidelines for which new prefer-
ences should be embedded in the upcoming CAP reform. The new prefer-
ences concerned preserving the rural social structure and the cultural
landscape. Farmers should also play an important role as both producers and
protectors of the environment through the introduction of less damaging
production methods. In general, it should be an independent goal of the CAP
to promote less intensive agricultural production. In addition, agricultural
support should be better distributed across farmers and regions of the EU.
Finally, according to the Commission, the CAP should have a more direct
impact on the incomes of farmers (Nedergaard 1995).
First and foremost, the MacSharry reform meant a considerable decrease
in the price of grain which was, however, compensated through direct
payments no matter whether farmers produced something or not. In addi-
tion, 15–20 per cent of the arable land had to be set aside, but this objective
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was only to be fulfilled for the large grain producers. Milk and beef produc-
ers also had to face price cuts taking into consideration the specific condi-
tions of the less efficient farmers. Finally, environmental concerns were much
more embedded in the MacSharry reform of 1992 than in the milk quota
arrangement eight years earlier.
Environmental concerns could have been part of the milk quota arrange-
ment. For example, one could have made it a condition for getting milk
quotas or — at least — for getting additional milk quotas that certain envi-
ronmental standards were met. However, environmental concerns were not
such a strong preference in 1984 as they had become by 1992 when they
were integrated into the reform as part of the new policy instruments. In
other words, new preferences were formed or constructed in the meantime
as part of a gradual development of so-called post-materialist preferences
(Hay 2002, 216–50). The most important new instrument in the MacSharry
reform was area premiums that compensated farmers for price cuts no
matter whether they utilized their land or not. Of course, this is meant as an
incentive to less intensive exploitation of the farming land.
In conclusion, after the implementation of the MacSharry reform, the level
of agricultural support was kept at the former level as desired by a well-
organized farm lobby; however, the payment for the support of farmers was
partly transferred from one weakly organized group (i.e. the consumers) to
another weakly organized group (i.e. the tax payers). At the same time, due
to changes in preferences as far as the EU decision makers and their constit-
uencies are concerned, the CAP had undergone a transformation from a high
price policy to a low price policy combined with direct payment ad modum
the US agricultural policy model.
1993–2003
The most significant ideational developments within the CAP in the period
from 1993–2003 — particularly since 1996 onwards — were the increasing
emphasis on food safety and food quality, but also — since the late 1990s —
an increased concern with the liberalization of agricultural trade and the
international competitiveness of European agriculture (Lynggaard 2006).
Compared with the 1992 CAP reform, the 2003 Fischler reform2 highlighted
even more environmental concerns in combination with other concerns with
regard to animal welfare and food security. Just as in 1992, ideas forming the
bases for trade negotiations within the WTO fed into the 2003 Fischler
reform. However, the Mad Cow crises, which were on top of the agenda
both in 1996 and again around 2000/2001, also played an important role as
a de-legitimizing factor as far as industrialized agriculture is concerned.
These crises were conducive to the development of more post-materialist
preferences among decision makers and their constituencies.
In was in this discursive context that the Commission in 2002 presented a
plan for a reform of the CAP. First, it proposed a full decoupling of the
support for farmers, i.e. that they would have no obligation to produce
agricultural goods (like grain) covered by the arrangement of direct support.
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Secondly, it meant that 20 per cent of all agricultural support was supposed
to be redirected towards general development of agricultural districts.
Thirdly, the Commission proposed price cuts for milk and grain. Fourthly,
the Commission introduced the concept of ‘cross-compliance’ which means
that the support for farmers should be given only on the condition that
certain criteria concerning environmental protection, animal welfare and
food security are met. From the very outset, Franz Fischler had support for
a  CAP reform from the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Sweden; however, the majority of member states opposed his reform plan.
Nevertheless, in May 2003, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Greece and Italy had
changed their beliefs concerning a reform of the CAP, and now accepted a
CAP reform, leaving France, Spain and Portugal without a blocking minor-
ity in the Council of Ministers (Nedergaard 2006b). As always, the final
reform was less radical than in the Commission’s original proposal. Among
other things, agricultural support was not fully decoupled and grain prices
were not cut. In addition, member states were given more administrative
flexibility in order to implement the reform. Nevertheless, the consequences
of the reform were clear: the agricultural support was now to be paid by tax
payers to an even greater extent than in the reform of 1992 (Nedergaard
2006a).
Comparison and Concluding Remarks
In comparison, clearly, the CAP reforms of 1984 onwards reflect a dramatic
shift as to how central decision makers and their constituencies think about
agricultural support. The preferences in the agricultural policy field of the
2000s are quite different from the 1980s. Within these twenty years a shift
in direction of post-materialist preferences had taken place. At the same time,
the institutional conditions in the form of organized interests, European
institutional actors and their interests, as well as the interests of member
states remain relatively unchanged. Agricultural interests have become
somewhat weaker during this period, but they are still more powerful than
those groups which are potential opponents of the financial support for
farmers, namely consumers and tax payers. Basically, the institutions consti-
tuting the political asymmetry of the ‘political market’ of the CAP are
relatively intact.
All three CAP reforms analysed in this paper signify a gradual shift in the
preferences in the area. Decision makers’ preferences have shifted, to a large
extent, over the time period analysed as a result of, among other things, the
shifting discourses with regard to the problems of the CAP. In other words,
preferences with regard to which set of agricultural problems should be
solved by which policy instruments have changed, whereas the institutions of
the CAP are relatively stable. Table 2 contains the changes with regard to the
preferences and institutions in the three reforms of the CAP.
When ideas and preferences within the CAP have been fixed or frozen for
a period of time, the content of the reforms may be explained on basis of
the potential asymmetry that prevails in the political market place between
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well-organized business interests, on the one hand, and the weakly organized
consumer and tax payers’ interests, on the other hand. At the same time, the
independent Commission and its specific position as a policy entrepreneur
within the EU political system is also an important impetus for all three CAP
reforms (cf. Nedergaard 2008).
The basic aim of this paper has been to argue that in order to move
towards a more comprehensive understanding of policy reforms we need to
bridge our knowledge from constructivists and rational choice institutional
perspectives. We have suggested that, on the one hand, constructivist argu-
ing processes may be useful to capture and conceptualize the medium to
longer term constructions — both in terms of continuity and change — of
the ideational context, which sets out the scope conditions for preference
formations. On the other hand, rationalist bargaining processes are helpful
Table 2. Three reforms of the CAP: changes in preferences and institutions
Reform Preferences Institutions
The milk 
quota 
arrangement 
in 1984
(1) Specific considerations to small 
producers.
(2) Specific considerations to 
disadvantaged areas.
(3) Preserve high price system.
(1) Very well-organized 
agricultural interests.
(2) Strong and independent 
Commission safeguarding the 
long term interests of the EU.
(3) A Council of Ministers 
structure making it possible 
for member states to promote 
short term interests.
The 
MacSharry 
reform of 
1992
(1) Specific considerations to small 
producers.
(2) Specific considerations to the 
environment.
(3) Gradual transformation of the 
CAP towards a low price 
system.
(1) Well-organized agricultural 
interests.
(2) Organized environmental 
interests.
(3) Strong and independent 
Commission safeguarding the 
long term interests of the EU.
(4) A Council of Ministers 
structure making it possible 
for member states to promote 
short term interests.
The Fischler 
reform of 
2003
(1) Specific considerations to small, 
non-industrialized producers.
(2) Specific considerations to the 
environment.
(3) Specific considerations to the 
food quality.
(1) Well-organized agricultural 
interests.
(2) Organized environmental 
interests.
(3) Strong and independent 
Commission safeguarding the 
long term interests of the EU.
(4) A Council of Ministers 
structure making it possible 
for member states to promote 
short term interests.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ly
ng
ga
ar
d,
 K
en
ne
t]
 A
t:
 1
2:
38
 1
7 
Ju
ne
 2
00
9
The Logic of Policy Development: CAP 1980–2003 307
when zooming-in on short term decision making characterized by agents
seeking to maximize their conceived interests in any given policy reform
process.
Notes
1. The distinction between the short term, the medium term and the long term is well known in
economic theory where these periods of time normally correspondent to up to three–four years,
between four and ten years and more than ten years, respectively.
2. Named after the Austrian commissioner for agriculture, Franz Fischler.
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